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“[S]overeign debt is a complex political institution, which cannot be reduced to
creditor coordination or any other contract problem.”

The Strained Marriage of Public Debts
and Private Contracts
ANNA GELPERN

A

s a new year begins, governments around
the world are poised for another cycle of
debt disputes and missed payments. Venezuela is stumbling into default after starving its
people for years to pay foreign creditors. Its hard
currency reserves are drying up under pressure
from US sanctions as the government battles hyperinflation, runs out of things to sell to China
and Russia, and tries to buy time with a wacky virtual currency scheme.
Meanwhile, Ukraine and Puerto Rico will each
go to court in January to fend off debt collectors.
Ukraine has appealed an English court decision
that would enforce its debt to Russia as if it were
an ordinary commercial contract, despite Russia’s
annexation of Crimea, crippling trade sanctions,
and sponsorship of separatist conflict in eastern
Ukraine. A fund known for making a fortune
from suing Argentina has challenged a US federal
law enacted in 2016 that promised bankruptcystyle debt relief for Puerto Rico. If the fund wins,
hopes for a fresh start for the hurricane-battered
commonwealth and an equitable resolution for its
creditors would dim.
On the bright side, Greece plans to exit the multilateral lending programs that many of its citizens
had come to associate with economic collapse, austerity, and loss of policy autonomy. It aims to return
to the private financial markets in the fall of 2018.
Looming in the background is its debt to euro area
governments, which will take generations to repay.
Each of these crises is intensely political, even
constitutional, but politics is barely visible in today’s sovereign debt restructuring regime. This informal regime coalesced in the 1980s and 1990s

around a relatively stable transatlantic core of governments, international organizations, and private
creditor groups, and depended on coordination
among them. Throughout this period, private capital flows grew in size and importance to sovereign
finance. In response, debt contract reform moved
to the forefront of the policy agenda, and quietly
took over.
Private contracts are the foundation of private
capital movements. The catch phrases “freedom
of contract” and “sanctity of contract” capture
the ideal: debtors and creditors freely agree on
the terms of their relationship up front, and must
abide by this private constitution in good times
and bad. Domestic courts step in only to resolve
disputes.
When governments borrow in the private financial markets, they enter into private debt contracts. These contracts are highly standardized,
which makes them easy to trade. In a world where
governments borrow primarily from the private
markets, changing contracts is an appealing way
to deal with sovereign debt crises. The trouble
is, governments are very different from private
debtors. Trying to solve public debt problems by
changing private contracts is at best inadequate.
At worst, it can backfire and complicate crisis response.

CONTRACT LOGIC
The logic of public debt policy investing so
heavily in private contract design is intriguing.
It holds that crises would be less frequent, less
protracted, and less damaging if only debtors and
creditors could tweak a few words in their IOUs.
Well-designed contracts might even make governments prudent and creditors collaborative.
The idea has a long and respectable pedigree.
In the 1930s, when the US Congress was debat-
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ing municipal bankruptcy legislation, experts at
ity and became firmly entrenched in the policy
the League of Nations weighed the relative merrepertoire. Early in the European debt crisis, in
its of a debt-restructuring treaty for governments
November 2010, euro area governments promised to change their contracts as part of a new
against debt contract clauses that would let creditors voluntarily reduce their claims by majority
regional crisis management and liquidity support
vote. Unlike municipal bankruptcy, sovereign
scheme.
The New York Times recognized the importance
bankruptcy was a political nonstarter then, and
of contracts in a 2014 editorial: responding to US
remains one now. A treaty never came to pass;
court rulings that directed Argentina to pay holdWorld War II put contract reform projects on the
out creditors in full if it made scheduled payments
back burner, while private markets for most government debt remained frozen for decades. Conon its restructured or new debt, the editorial called
tract reform came back when the private markets
on governments to adopt majority amendment
revived in the late twentieth century; it has prosterms in their bonds to avoid Argentina’s fate. Mapered over time and across wildly different instijority amendment clauses (also known as collectutional contexts.
tive action clauses or CACs) typically set out a proAt the turn of the twenty-first century, a discedure by which creditors owed money under the
tressed sovereign would normally secure emersame contract can vote to change the debt terms.
gency funding from the International Monetary
For example, a supermajority of three-quarters
Fund (IMF), tied to economic reforms. The
might agree to reduce principal or defer interest
agreement would anticipate a mix of domestic
payments. Recent variations on CACs allow creditors under multiple contracts to aggregate into a
savings and measures to boost revenue, new borrowing, and debt relief. The debtor would then
single voting pool. Versions of majority amendseek concessions from its conment found their way into most
stituents: economic sacrifice
new sovereign bonds by 2017.
from its citizens, debt relief or
For all their prominence and
Government debt is an
new money from its creditors.
recent success, sovereign debt
inherently political and
Different creditor groups—
contracts are unlikely levers
constitutional project.
governments, banks, bondfor reform, for several reasons.
holders—held distinct claims
First, government promises are
on the debtor, and negotiated
hard to enforce. No court can
separately. The entire process was implicitly anmake a sovereign do as it is told, since national
chored in the IMF, and the whole system held toborders and sovereign immunity shield its assets
gether when each group linked its contributions
and keep its officials out of jail. Why spend scarce
to those of the others. The job of debt contracts
policy resources finessing unenforceable boilerwas to coordinate private creditors and deter free
plate?
riders.
Second, standard-form bond contracts are notoThis set of nonbinding but reasonably predictriously hard to change. Academic studies confirm
able practices evolved from one crisis to another,
market reports that these contracts are “sticky”—
and delivered just enough relief to the debtors and
slow to assimilate new terms even if they would
returns to the creditors to preempt more radical
improve on the status quo. Sovereign bond conproposals, especially a sovereign bankruptcy treatracts might be stickier than most, because their
ty. To be sure, the regime was far from perfect. It
role in the financial system generally requires
was notoriously slow, stingy, and unaccountable.
them to be actively traded. Forcing investors to
By 2010, it showed signs of strain.
pause and analyze new words might scare off buyNew private and government creditors, such
ers. It took years and several rounds of concerted
as China, Russia, and the Gulf states, were only
intervention by world leaders to make majority
provisionally invested in the old restructuring inamendment clauses the norm across the foreign
stitutions. The IMF shrank by comparison with
sovereign bond markets. Yet their impact may be
private capital flows, and its ability to anchor crismall or uncertain, depending on the precise forsis responses on its own was openly questioned.
mulation and other factors.
Regional safety nets emerged as complements
Third, private contracts are private. Unlike statand competitors to the IMF in Asia and in Euutes and treaties, contracts are made behind closed
rope. Meanwhile, contract reform gained visibildoors between debtors and creditors, some of
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whom happen to be sovereign governments. International officials have no comparative advantage
in drafting the terms, and no sure way to enforce
compliance. Decentralization, lack of information,
and coordination problems among governments
and market participants make contracts an awkward policy vehicle.

FREE RIDING

Hedge funds that make a killing by suing poor
countries over defaulted debts are the bête noire of
sovereign debt policy. These “vulture funds” have
long supplied the core rationale for majority modification clauses in sovereign bonds, since they free
ride on the sacrifices of other creditors and the
country’s citizens.
LEFT OUT
The fifteen-year battle between Argentina and
Despite such practical objections, contracts rea handful of funds in US federal courts validated
main popular because they can deliver some of the
the contract narrative. The most aggressive and
creditor collective action benefits of bankruptcy
patient vultures recouped more than 1,000 perwithout arousing the same level of political hoscent of their investment in 2016. Court sanctions
tility. For technocrats and politicians, contract
that prompted Argentina to default on all its debt
reform has become a pragmatic problem-solving
rather than pay the holdouts, and then eventually
approach that does no apparent harm. Missing
drove it to settle with them, hinged on a single
from this calculus is the idea that sovereign debt
clause. Judges stressed that debtors and crediis a complex political institution, which cannot
tors could avoid a bad outcome by changing their
be reduced to creditor coordination or any othcontracts. In response, financial industry groups
er contract problem. The biggest risk of putting
worked hand in hand with policy makers to deso much energy into contract reform lies not in
sign and promote new model contract terms.
contracts per se, but rather in what falls by the
But vulture funds were not the biggest holdwayside.
outs in the most recent soverFraming public debt as
eign bond restructurings. Ina private contract problem
stead, the honors went to the
Politics is barely visible
leaves essential questions
European Central Bank (ECB)
in today’s sovereign
in Greece and to Russia’s sovoutside the frame. Consider
debt restructuring regime.
ereign wealth fund in Ukraine.
Venezuela, where no amount
In 2012, the ECB escaped hairof tinkering with contracts
cuts on more than $60 billion
would convince the government to secure enough debt relief from its
in Greek bonds identical to those that got written
creditors to feed its people. Consider Ukraine,
down by 60 percent in the hands of private crediwhose president rushed to borrow $3 billion
tors and Norwegian and Chinese government infrom Russia shortly before he was driven from
vestment funds. (The ECB swapped its bonds for
new ones with different serial numbers.) In a later
power and Russia annexed Crimea. His successors got stuck repaying a creditor that did its
submission to Germany’s federal constitutional
best to sabotage Ukraine’s economy, boycotted
court, the ECB said it would vote against restructuring sovereign bonds in its portfolio, since it
restructuring talks, and sued to enforce the debt
lacked authority to compromise its claims.
contract in an English court. Consider Greece,
While Greece chose to stay in the euro area
which enacted pathbreaking changes to its foreign bond contracts, and—after an elegantly
and keep paying the ECB, Ukraine tried to walk
executed restructuring of most bonds held by
away from its debt to Russia. When the bond
private creditors—was left with a mountain of
trustee sued on Russia’s behalf, the English court
debt to euro area governments.
acknowledged that it was not dealing with a
In each case, better contracts might smooth the
garden-variety obligation. However, the judge
debt restructuring process or buy time to design
would not consider Ukraine’s claims that Russia
a solution to the crisis; in no case are they themhad pressured it into borrowing the money and
selves the solution. Using private bond contracts
later undermined its capacity to repay. He held
as a substitute for public institution-building does
that claims of duress in the case involved matters
not simply leave core questions unaddressed. It
of public international law and fell beyond the
can do new damage by encouraging free riders,
purview of local commercial courts—and that
undermining government accountability, and
Russian interference with Ukraine’s repayment
seeding future political conflict.
was not expressly barred by contract. Because
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the debt took the form of potentially “transferable financial instruments” (Russia still held the
lot), the court would not reach beyond “the four
corners of the relevant contracts” to punish inequitable behavior.
Greece showed that contract form could be ignored to spare the ECB. Ukraine showed that contract form could be leveraged to Russia’s advantage. Both free-riding opportunities arose from a
mismatch between the impersonal, standardized
contract form and the complex political relationship between the debtor and the creditor. Other
central banks and sovereign wealth funds would
be hard-pressed not to exploit such an opportunity where they had the power to do so.
Ideal bond contracts are a little like money, supremely easy to transfer and trade without regard
to the particular debtor-creditor relationship. Yet
government-to-government lending is mixedmotive, never entirely arm’s length, impossible to
strip of political and policy considerations. Governments have extrajudicial means of protecting
their interests, using diplomacy, trade, or military
force.
A creditor unconstrained by commercial motives could be altruistic and patient, but could just
as easily use its position to bully or extract strategic concessions from the sovereign debtor. It could
go to court to embarrass the debtor, or cause political trouble, even if doing so made little financial
sense. It does not need contracts to get paid, and
it can choose to use contracts for commercial or
noncommercial ends. In today’s sovereign debt restructuring regime, a government creditor holding
a bond can choose to act as an official or private
creditor, and change its mind at any time.
Looking back at the Greek and Ukrainian experiences, it should come as no surprise that bond
contracts are ill-equipped to manage political conflict. No amount of drafting finesse can change
that. When clauses designed to coordinate a discrete subset of creditors are called on to respond
to constitutional and geopolitical crises, they will
fall short, and may backfire. This does not mean
that contracts or contract reforms are worthless,
but rather that they are a limited tool, which tends
to get overloaded in sovereign debt for lack of politically palatable alternatives.

TWILIGHT IN CARACAS
If the contract form was ignored in Greece and
abused in Ukraine, it is even more vulnerable in
Venezuela. The sovereign and the state oil con-

glomerate PDVSA together owe at least $60 billion
to bondholders, somewhere in the neighborhood
of $25 billion to China and $10 billion to Russia,
and billions more to investors and suppliers. The
increasingly repressive and erratic government of
President Nicolás Maduro has shrunk imports,
abandoned investment, and failed to meet the basic human needs of its population in an effort to
keep up the debt payments while the economy
crumbles.
It is hard to explain why a leftist government
would take food and medicine from the poor
to pay Wall Street, which has long priced in default. Venezuelan officials may believe that default
would put the country’s oil tankers at risk of being seized by creditors on the high seas, cut off
export revenues, and endanger the regime’s hold
on power. Rumors of bonds owned by insiders and
other corrupt schemes have been floating around
for years. Whatever the reason, the case highlights
an underappreciated dimension of sovereign immunity: just as no one can force a sovereign to pay
on command, no one can force it to default.
In Venezuela’s case, it has not been for lack of
trying. The United States has ratcheted up sanctions against Venezuelan entities and Maduro associates. After the government sidelined the opposition-dominated legislature in 2017, US sanctions
effectively blocked it from issuing new debt or renegotiating the old bonds. By year’s end, sanctions
had begun to interfere with debt payments and attempts to settle trade and investment disputes.
China and Russia kept the Maduro government
afloat for several years with cash infusions and
critical inputs, mostly in exchange for future oil
deliveries. Both sought dirt-cheap oil and strategic
assets, but their case for sponsorship weakened
over the course of 2017 as oil production fell and
Maduro lurched from one desperate measure to
the next. Chinese and Russian entities have sued;
Russia even seized a tanker in the Caribbean.
With relatively small amounts of unpaid invoices
at stake, the government was quick to settle. Such
lawsuits would not trigger regime change; they do,
however, point to looming financial constraints
and aggressive enforcement.
Contracts have been marginal to Venezuela’s
story so far, notwithstanding voluminous commentary on its bond terms in market reports and
academic publications. Few expected the Maduro
government to last this long, or to default and
still hang on to power. Many foreign creditors had
planned on a new market-friendly government, the
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lifting of sanctions, a comprehensive workout unNonetheless, unemployment lingers above 20 perder the auspices of the IMF, and maybe bankruptcy
cent, and the total burden of Greek government
for PDVSA. In this scenario, contracts would take
debt ($383 billion in 2017) is stuck at around 180
center stage. For as long as default happens under
percent of gross domestic product; more than twothe current government and against its wishes, the
thirds is owed to euro area governments and instirestructuring path is muddled.
tutions.
While bondholders are still debating whether
Greek debt to its European neighbors has been
the government is in default, new investor and
a source of tension within Europe and between
supplier lawsuits crop up daily. Venezuela has
Europe and the IMF. The IMF lost face over its failure to secure more debt relief from Greece’s private
settled a handful, including one brought by a Cacreditors before 2012, for letting public funds be
nadian firm that pursued an especially skillful and
used to repay maturing debts to private creditors
aggressive litigation strategy. The terms were rein 2010–11, and for apparently excessive deference
portedly favorable to the investor—which should
to its “troika” partners, the European Commission
encourage imitators—but details are sketchy.
and the ECB, in the Greek program’s design. Since
The financial and legal terms of China’s and
2015, the IMF has stood accused of overcompenRussia’s contracts are also a mystery. Both governsating for past errors: using its small share of the
ments gave Venezuela breathing room in the past,
Greek financing package as a platform, the IMF
but there is no guarantee that they would particihas demanded deeper debt relief from euro area
pate in a broad-based restructuring. If they do,
governments and institutions, and refused to comthey might decide to treat their dealings with Venpromise on what some European officials saw as
ezuela and PDVSA as private secured debts, as trade
claims for oil deliveries, or as foreign aid. Each
minor differences in budget assumptions. Critics
of these implies a different reargue that the IMF is needlessly dwelling on the size of the
structuring process, repayment
Greek debt stock, when paypriority, recovery value, and
Bond contracts are
ment flows are all that matter.
free-riding opportunity. China,
ill-equipped to manage
Euro area members have
Russia, suppliers, or direct inpolitical conflict.
made impressive concessions.
vestors could plausibly get paid
Public-sector creditors have
in full from remaining reserves,
extended maturities and reor strip valuable assets. Then
duced interest rates on Greek debt many times
bondholders, with their state-of-the-art contracts,
since the 2012 bond restructuring, so that Greece
would be left fighting for crumbs.
has hardly any payments due to them for years to
In the twilight before default, the fact that so
come. This helps explain private creditors’ willmany contracts are nonexistent or unknown, and
ingness to buy short- and medium-term Greek
so many others could be changed retroactively on
debt. Researchers estimate that Europe has writa whim, is a symptom of the continuing deterioraten off more than half of its claims, in presenttion of the old restructuring institutions.
value terms.
THE GREEK LABYRINTH
A recent working paper by the Peterson InstiWhen a newly elected Greek government distute for International Economics argues that excovered in 2009 that its predecessors had falsified
tending principal repayment even farther into the
debt and deficit statistics, the country plunged into
future, as far as 2080, would help make Greek
a catastrophic debt crisis that quickly spread across
debt sustainable. But apart from disagreement on
Europe. Greece suffered eight years of economic
the economic merits of further rescheduling, legal
collapse, political strife, and societal breakdown.
and political imperatives prevent European govAt long last, it seems to have turned the corner. In
ernments from admitting to their citizens that they
December 2017, the government exchanged more
have granted any debt relief, lest they be accused
than $35 billion in old bonds for new ones with
of subsidizing a profligate neighbor in violation of
lower interest rates and longer maturities. It plans
a European treaty prohibition on fiscal transfers.
to “graduate” from the IMF and European rescue
The same barriers stand in the way of principal
programs by the fall of 2018, and to sell new debt
reduction.
in the capital markets. It has attracted large-scale
Debt sustainability analysis that focuses solely
infrastructure investment, notably from China.
on payment flows and the present value of Greek
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obligations ignores a central political dimension
of debt. The debtor-creditor relationship is inherently hierarchical. For Greece, as for many lowincome countries without market access, being in
debt to governments and international organizations comes at the cost of policy autonomy.
From the creditors’ perspective this is a necessity, since they do not trust the debtor to manage
its economy. The debt obligation and the associated policy conditions offer a means of control.
For European creditor governments, postponing
principal repayment has three big advantages over
principal reduction: it would achieve debt relief
and facilitate private market access for Greece, establish a platform to monitor Greek policy performance until the debt matures, and allow creditor
governments to tell their own citizens that they
are getting repaid in full (at least nominally).
The downside of postponing repayment rather
than reducing the principal is that it risks perpetuating what has become a toxic debtor-creditor relationship for generations. If the goal is to build
a healthy political community in Europe, it is far
from obvious that avoiding bailouts today is worth
the cost of entrenching inequality in the long run.

UNEQUAL RELATIONSHIP
Contrary to the image of a fresh start, debt restructuring often reduces policy autonomy for
sovereign debtors, particularly when the creditors
are foreign governments or international institutions. Debt problems are presumptively attributed
to economic mismanagement. It seems axiomatic
that a durable recovery and a return to debt sustainability require policy reform, which in turn
requires monitoring and enforcement by someone
other than the voters who failed at it to begin with.
The debtor-creditor relationship is well suited to
the task.
Conditionality, monitoring, and enforcement are
not necessarily altruistic. Government creditors are
in the business of lending taxpayer funds to achieve
public policy objectives, and are accountable to
their citizens for the results. They are not necessarily accountable to the borrowing government or
its people, even though they may effectively take
over that government’s policy functions, and even
though citizens of debtor and creditor nations may
have different policy preferences.
Greece again presents a stark example. Reform
programs designed by its public sector creditors
often included assumptions about tax and privatization revenues that were criticized as unreal-

istic and projections of growth, unemployment,
and market access that turned out to be wrong by
a wide margin. Multiple studies and internal assessments highlight such errors, which may have
reflected political pressure, excess optimism, or a
mix of factors. More recently, Europe and the IMF
have had trouble agreeing on a single set of assumptions for the Greek program.
The consequences of wrong assumptions and
bad policy design fall overwhelmingly on the
debtor, along with the cost of its own poor policy
performance. Under the circumstances, creditors
have limited incentives to come up with good
designs and realistic projections, unless they are
facing payment default or reputational damage of
existential proportions.
Contract tools can help reallocate the burden
of policy design and performance—for example,
by building in triggers for automatic debt relief if
policy assumptions turn out to be wildly off the
mark. Debt relief need not absolve sovereign debtors of the consequences of economic mismanagement, but it can be calibrated to share responsibility more equitably, and to create incentives for
citizens of creditor countries to hold their own
representatives to account when they design policies for citizens of other countries. While public
sector creditors can profit by adapting private contract techniques, technique can never be the whole
story. Allocating policy responsibility between
debtors and creditors, and calibrating loss-sharing
triggers, are political decisions about distribution.
Contracts merely implement them.

DEBT POLITICS
Government debt is an inherently political
and constitutional project. Alexander Hamilton
famously argued that federal debt would bind a
loose confederation of states into a nation, and
help invest the young nation’s commercial elites
in the fortunes of its federal government. Public
debt, whether owed to governments or private
creditors, can serve as the foundation for domestic money and credit, fuel economic and political development, and cement international alliances. Foreign debt—owed to the governments
of France and Spain, and to Dutch bankers—
helped finance US independence from Britain. It
also featured prominently in nineteenth-century
colonial conquests and twentieth-century imperial breakups.
Against this historical background, the rise of
private contract design to its preeminent place in
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sovereign debt policy at the start of the twentyfirst century seems anomalous and risky. The
dominance of private international capital markets calls for more attention to contracts, but not
to the exclusion of building public institutions.
The limits of debt contracts as a policy tool have
become apparent as the existing regime for sovereign debt restructuring is challenged by the
demise of legal and geographic boundaries, and
the rise of new creditors with no stake in old institutions. Established creditor coordination practices are breaking down, and the sovereign debt
restructuring regime suddenly looks fragmented
and barren, devoid of shared norms and values.
Neither debtors nor creditors, public or private,
care to talk about the political core of sovereign
debt. It brings up uncomfortable questions of legitimacy and distribution, and reveals the limits
of sovereignty that no one wants to admit. For experts in finance ministries and international institutions, politics can be a source of uncertainty and
an obstacle to optimal technocratic solutions.
The unfolding crisis in Venezuela highlights the
urgency of addressing sovereign debt politics head
on. Years spent refining contract terms to smooth
a consensual restructuring process and rejecting
calls to institutionalize common standards for responsible lending and borrowing, including criteria for marking debt issued by oppressive regimes
as “odious” and making it uncollectable, have left
the international community ill-prepared to deal
with a corrupt government that starves its people
and sells assets in secret to pay its creditors. Is the
Maduro regime “odious”? Absent international
consensus on the answer, US bilateral sanctions
complicate life for the Venezuelan government,
but they also make for an easy scapegoat and bolster its popularity at home.
Failure to convince new creditors such as China
that reformed debt-restructuring institutions can
serve their interests encourages free riding. Why
should China seek international cooperation to
collect from Venezuela, Congo, or Angola if it can
get a better deal on its own, just as the ECB did in
Greece? Private law doctrines that banished politics from sovereign-debt contract disputes created
an opening for Russia to use English courts to harass Ukraine.
Engagement with politics and public institution-building does not dictate the embrace of par-

ticular institutional forms, such as treaty-based
bankruptcy. Puerto Rico’s troubles illustrate that
bankruptcy as such is not a silver bullet, and that
political forces can twist bankruptcy tools beyond
recognition.
The US Congress wrote a special bankruptcy
law to help Puerto Rico work its way out from
under a mountain of debt. The debt itself came
of decades of mismanagement, which is hard to
separate from the deeply dysfunctional relationship between the island commonwealth and the
United States, infected with colonial dominance,
economic dependency, and distortionary fiscal
policies. No bankruptcy law can fix all that, and
the federal law enacted in 2016 does not try. But
it does go the extra mile for one constituency—
private bondholders—by tiptoeing around such
basic bankruptcy tasks as gathering all competing claims in a single process, arranging them in
an intelligible order of distribution, and overriding individual contracts to assign each claim a fair
share of the assets, which would give the island a
fresh start.
Durable reform requires constituents invested
in the project. This means, among other things,
making vast improvements in public disclosure of
sovereign debt terms and restructuring outcomes,
developing coordination mechanisms among regional and international safety nets, and elaborating the standards for debt legitimacy, sanctions,
and equitable loss sharing.
Public debt cannot be left entirely or even mostly to private ordering. It is bigger than any one
contract dispute. It has too many core constituents
outside the four corners of the contract, including
taxpayers, pensioners, government workers, bank
depositors, and other governments, to name just a
few. This is not a complex or controversial insight,
but turning it into tractable policies is technically
daunting and politically risky.
Modern sovereign debt history is littered with
stalled and abandoned treaties and institutions,
from the League of Nations to the United Nations
and the IMF. The temptation to turn to private contract adjustment as an alternative is irresistible. It
is time to recognize this as a false alternative: even
if it makes good sense as a matter of contract design and helps buy time for political compromise,
it can never be that compromise, for the simple
reason that public debt is irreducibly public. !

